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G9  Ability to run under Windows OS.  F   













M4  Ability to view a physical schematic of a system.  A  1 












































































































































M42  Ability to recall a user’s saved viewing preferences.  B  3 
















M39  Ability to organize and index ACAWS data sets.   B  5 



























M47  Ability to view a time series plot of the diagnoses.  F   





















































































I9  Ability to associate and view timing of failure propagation.  C  4 
5.5 Recovery and Workaround 


























































































































































G9  Ability to run under Windows OS.  F  P 
G10  Ability to run under Mac OS.  F  P 
 
Table 5: Model Manager ­­ Merge Models capability. 

















































































G18  Ability to load an existing ACAWS data set.  A  C 








Req. #  Requirement & Rationale  Add in  Demo 
M39  Ability to organize and index ACAWS data sets.   B  P 
M40  Ability to search for a data set in ACAWS data set repository.  B  P 
 
Table 10: Root Cause Manager ­­ Health Status capability. 







































Req. #  Requirement & Rationale  Add in  Demo 
F6  Ability to identify if more than one component is suspect.  A  C 



















































































































Req. #  Requirement & Rationale  Add in  Demo 
G12  Ability to display models in MOD graphical format standards.  A  C 
M4  Ability to view a physical schematic of a system.  A  C 


































































































M47  Ability to view a time series plot of the diagnoses.  F  SM 
 
Table 26: User Interface ­­ Display ACAWS Status/Configuration capability. 
Req. #  Requirement & Rationale  Add in  Demo 

















Req. #  Requirement & Rationale  Add in  Demo 

























































M42  Ability to recall a user’s saved viewing preferences.  B  P 
M43  Ability to edit a user’s viewing preferences.  B  P 
 
Table 29: Unclassified requirements. 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Step   MET  Event              TEAMS Diagnosis  MSID 























8 21.4416 FCS CH1 Off <FA1 MDM Failure> Crew  takes channel of‐line 
via D&C; 



























































































































































































































































































































































































ACAWS Advanced Caution and Warning System 
AMISS Anomaly Monitoring Inductive Software System (aka IMS outside JSC) 
API Application Programming Interface 
ARC NASA Ames Research Center 
C&W Caution and Warning 
CAD Computer Aided Design 
CHIT Abbreviation used for Mission Action Request 
ConFRM Constraints and Flight Rule Management 
CRANS Configurable Real-time Analysis System 
CSV Comma Separated Values (common file format) 
CxPASS Constellation Procedures Application Software Suite
DFT Design for Testability 
DTO Development Test Objective 
ELOG Event Logger 
EPS Electrical Power System 
EVA Extra Vehicular Activity 
FCT Flight Control Team 
FFA Functional Fault Analysis (Ares I TEAMS modeling and analysis effort) 
FN Flight Note 
FTT Full-task Trainer 
GMT Greenwich Mean Time (aka UTC) 
GNC Guidance, Navigation, and Control (controller position for Shuttle) 
IMS Inductive Monitoring System (aka AMISS at JSC) 
ISP Information Sharing Protocol 
JPL NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
JSC NASA Johnson Space Center 
KSC NASA Kennedy Space Center 
LCC Launch Commit Criteria 
LRU Line Replaceable Unit 
MCC Mission Control Center (JSC) 
MCT Mission Control Technologies 
MER Mission Evaluation Room 
MET Mission Elapsed Time 
MOD Mission Operations Directorate (JSC) 
MSFC NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 
MSID Measurement Stimulation Identification (term used for to identify a specific measurement) 
MSK Manual Select Keyboard (Apollo); now refers to tabular display. 
ORU Orbital Replaceable Unit 
PRACA Problem Reporting and Corrective Action 
PTT Part-task Trainer 
QSI Qualtech Systems Inc. 
RECON Reconfiguration 
SFRM Space Flight Resource Management (similar to aircraft Crew Resource Management, CRM) 
SITF Source-Independent Telemetry File 
SRB Solid Rocket Booster 
TEAMS Testability Engineering and Maintenance System 
TVC Thrust Vector Control 
Unique-
identifier 
PUI, MSID, CUI, etc.; a method to associate a parameter/measurement with a unique name 








































































































  Should consider modification of ACAWS data sets concurrently by multiple users. Integrating those 
modifications into a single data set will likely require human collaboration. It becomes especially difficult 
when multiple people are independently modifying the same component. Merging of model edits from 
multiple users is as complex as merging software code modifications. Things are slightly easier if I/O ports 
are not changed. Implies centralized repository of models, perhaps in RDS. 
 Need to evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of connecting to ISP via MCT versus a direct connection to 
ISP null server. Some possible benefits of connecting via MCT include existing infrastructure for 
displaying/manipulating visual elements, ISP connectivity, and transparency of telemetry value source.  
 Extracting a functional model from physical model is a difficult thing to do. 
 Ability to view health status on the schematic is complicated because the sets of good, bad, and suspect can 
represent many actual state vectors of the system. Thus, the overlay of the info can be misleading. 
Producing consistent diagnoses from the three lists (good, bad, suspect) is not trivial. 
 To clearly distinguish modification of a model, need to define a model diff function which can take two 
models are determine the changes. 
 The models-to-D-matrix relationship is many-to-one. That is, many models can translate to a single 
TEAMS D-matrix. Because of this, model changes will need to be constrained to changes of the graphical 
representation of the model and cannot be made directly in the D-matrix or tabular representation. Changes 
to the D-matrix cannot be uniquely translated back to a graphical model.  
 Enumerate what entities MCC operators may need to modify for each of the plan-train-fly tasks. Of this 
list, enumerate the entities that can be modified in ACAWS vs. those that must be done in TEAMS 
Designer.  
 Should MCC operators be allowed to change the relationship between tests (observable effects) and failure 
modes? 
 Formally map every piece of TEAMS model: (module, switch, AND node, test point, and effect node) to 
source material. That linking is critical to the review process as well – might as well use the information 
during operation. 
 Showing spatial information (like physical location of heaters) can be implemented in multiple ways. One 
is to show a 2D view of the information, as they do now on system handbooks drawings. The other would 
require 3D drawings. The 3D approach would require mappings between 2D schematics and 3D drawings, 
a non-trivial process. It’s also not trivial to compute distance between components to show spatial relations. 
 Different types of zoom: physical, functional and Level of Detail (LOD). 
 The structure of ACAWS will determine how difficult this is to implement. If the model has a physical 
breakdown then extracting functional breakdown will be hard. 
 A long-term requirement may be to subscribe to DVIS (old) VOIP voice loops to get context information to 
focus models. This would anticipate the controller’s need for a model based on what’s being talked about 
on the voice loop. Many issues to resolve if this becomes a need, including which controller is focused on 
which systems, which types of conversations require looking at a new model or a new area of the model, 
whether users want displays to refocus without their input, etc. 
 To search ACAWS models, entities will need to be labeled (tagged). In TEAMS, labels can be placed on 
modules, testpoints, tests, effect nodes and lines. Labels cannot be placed on AND Nodes and switches. 
 Connecting paths between selected items may be different in nominal situations versus in failure situations. 
For example, if filter is clogged, flow backs up. The path between selected items may vary according to the 
fault case. TEAMS Model has to capture both the nominal and failure path. On Ares, when connectivity is 
reviewed some failure paths are given a tag of “model abstraction” because they are only in the TEAMS 
model to propagate faults upstream. 
 A propagation path in TEAMS is obtained via DFT analysis. TEAMS Designer shows it as a purple line 
between components. A limitation of the TEAMS DFT analysis is that if there is not a path from fault to 
  89
test then no path is shown. It might be helpful to see a partial path to determine how far propagation 
occurred before it was stopped. 
 Priority/severity information may be provided in Hazard Reports or other program documentation. 
ACAWS should reuse this information whenever available. Need to determine how to assign 
severity/priority when more than one failure is occurring at once. 
 To view diagnoses as a time-series plot, the diagnoses can be treated as enums and display in step function 
form as digital circuits are displayed. 
 When specifying new tests directly on the ACAWS model, ACAWS will need to update the model itself, 
update the subscription to the appropriate comp, and generate the comp. 
 In the Ares FFA project, failures modes are grouped by using TEAMS hierarchy labels for LRU. All failure 
modes under an LRU are grouped with the LRU. 
 To view suspect components in probabilistic order, need to define source material for model. Ranking by 
probability can be done if failure modes are physical. If failure modes are functional then ranking is not 
possible. 
 To get root cause with TEAMS, closest functionality available is minimal diagnosis. However, that fails 
when multiple groups of suspects can explain all the test results (rather than just a single group). In that 
case, there is no “TEAMS minimum diagnosis”. Instead, the groups are kept on the suspect list. 
 To view all items that would fail for a specified unique-identifier (PUI, MSID, etc.), can look down 
columns in the D-matrix that use that unique-identifier in a test. 
 In regards to “Ability to suppress previous failures so that new failures are more evident,” TEAMS should 
continue with the knowledge that previous failures occurred (i.e., switches should not need to be reset in 
the model). It’s the user interface that has to mark it as “previously failed” vs. “newly failed” to make the 
appearance of new failures more obvious. 
 In order to compute failure propagation timing, reference materials will need to contain that information. If 
the initial TEAMS models are not already populated with that information, MOD will need to add it to 
meet this requirement. Once the times are in the model, TEAMS can annotate the propagation line (“the 
purple line”) with times. To use it in ACAWS, we’d need an API to retrieve that information from 
TEAMS. 
 As long as a hierarchy label can be attached in the model, perhaps additional properties may need to used in 
TEAMS to model criticality. Probably need to attach criticality outside of TEAMS. 
 Determining impact of failure to a mission requires mapping from behavior/structure to functions. Will 
need Masterlogic Diagram functionality – similar to what was implemented in SeaClif. Can also be pulled 
from FMEA RBD criticality (e.g. Crit 1R2 – means need two to fail to lose function). 
 When considering impact of failures, limit to “annunciate when one failure away” rather than “specify 
number of failures away for any failure” because of the expected redundancy limitations of future 
spacecraft. 
 Recovery procedures can be linked to single failures. For example, for ISS, Caution & Warning tables 
provide a mapping between conditions and corrective action procedures. If there are multiple failures, 
recovery procedures can be prioritized by failure priority. To recover from all failures simultaneously 
would be outside the scope of preplanned contingencies. A reactive planning software system would be 
needed to develop a procedure to recover from multiple failures. To reuse existing procedures for this task, 
procedures may need to be annotated with goal statements, i.e., rationale for each step in a procedure and 
any constraints for sequencing the steps.  
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Availability: NASA CASI (443) 757-5802
The current focus of ACAWS is on the needs of the flight controllers. The onboard crew in low͈Earth orbit has some of those same
needs. Moreover, for future deep͈space missions, the crew will need to accomplish many tasks autonomously due to
communication time delays. Although we are focusing on flight controller needs, ACAWS technologies can be reused for on͈board
application, perhaps with a different level of detail and different display formats or interaction methods. We expect that providing
similar tools to the flight controllers and the crew could enable more effective and efficient collaboration as well as heightened
situational awareness.
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